The government must find a way to deter and derail the existential threat posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To achieve these outcomes, Taipei needs to maintain a strong and enduring partnership with the US.
This strategic bond is reinforced by a number of shared identities. As pointed out by Michael Walsh and John Hemmings (“Sensitive Pacific Pact needs attention,” Oct. 7, page 8), the myth of being a Pacific nation is not one of them. Taipei should explore the merits of reimagining itself as a Pacific nation too.
The US has long toyed with the idea of being a Pacific nation. However, former US president Barack Obama inflected a major shift toward that identity when he declared that “the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation.” Framing his assertion as a “fundamental truth,” Obama set into motion the reimagining of the US as a Pacific nation through a combination of rhetoric and narrative.
On the backs of Asian immigration and fallen soldiers, the Obama administration constructed a persuasive story about how a “complex and intricate mix of history, ideas and interests” had transformed the country into a Pacific nation long ago, Satu Limaye, vice president of the Washington-based East-West Center, wrote in a 2012 article for Education About Asia (which the authors acknowledge as an inspiration for this article).
In this way, a mental image was formed that eventually rooted in the collective consciousness of US thought leaders, Limaye wrote. Now, many American policymakers accept the claim that the US is a Pacific nation as fact.
Few places have struggled with the concept of collective identity like Taiwan. For decades, the question of what demonym to use for the people of Taiwan has been at the forefront of national debates and the cause of international concern. After a multi-decade struggle for the preservation of autonomy from the PRC, attitudes have somewhat shifted on the idea of being Taiwanese. Many still cling onto the identity of being Chinese. There remains no consensus on national identity.
However, a strong affinity has been forged around several other identities. These include being a democratic state and an East Asian state. While the identity of being a democratic state is shared with the US, being an East Asian state is not. If there was another regional identity jointly held by both partners, this gap would lose much of its significance. It is therefore somewhat surprising that Taipei has not devoted more time and effort to exploring whether becoming a Pacific nation could bridge that divide.
If the government took a closer look at the merits, policymakers would find that it is not difficult to craft a persuasive story about Taiwan being a Pacific nation.
Their first glance should be directed at geography. As American writer Walter Lippman once said: “The world that we have to deal with politically ... is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported and imagined.” That is why “cognitive frameworks” drawn from “geographic considerations” have such a profound role to play in domestic and foreign affairs.
Fortunately, Taiwan is gifted with the “blessing of geography,” as former US secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a speech in 2011.
Composed of a set of islands in the western Pacific that are situated at approximately the same latitude as the Hawaiian islands, Taiwan lies proximate to what is commonly referred to as the Pacific islands region. Taipei is about 1,600km closer to Koror, Palau, than Los Angeles is to Honolulu. If US policymakers can draw a mental map around Pacific nations that is inclusive of the US, then surely Taiwan can do the same.
Their second glance should be directed at history, culture and language. The connections between Taiwan and Pacific nations extend far beyond geographic happenstance. The historical ties between indigenous Taiwanese and other Pacific islanders are well documented. Although the history of the Austronesian and Lapita cultures remains the subject of debate, there is evidence that the Neolithic-era expansion of Austronesian-speaking people can be traced back to an Austronesian homeland in Taiwan.
Either way, the Austronesian family of languages continues to provide a linguistic bridge between the indigenous communities of Taiwan and their Pacific islander cousins. The government has been taking steps to protect that connection. In 2017, the Indigenous Languages Development Act (原住民族語言發展法) was promulgated to “carry out historical justice, promote the preservation and development of indigenous languages, and secure indigenous language usage and heritage.”
Language is only part of the story. The revival of Taiwanese indigenous culture has become a touchstone topic among the majority Han Taiwanese population. This has created additional space to emphasize Taiwan’s Austronesian roots on the national stage. Although often overlooked, Taiwan’s experiences with colonization and conflict provide another common ground with Pacific nations.
At various times, the territory of Taiwan has been possessed by Portugal, Spain and Japan. This mirrors the colonial experiences of many Pacific island countries. Moreover, Taipei was heavily bombed by foreign militaries during World War II, although that story is not widely acknowledged in contemporary discourses. These experiences provide a shared platform on which to construct the story of Taiwan as a Pacific nation.
The third glance should be directed at common security and political interests. Taiwan and Pacific nations share traditional security concerns. In close partnership with the US, Taiwan seeks to deter an invasion by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has not renounced the use of force in its pursuit to annex Taiwan.
While Pacific island countries might not fear an imminent PLA invasion, they certainly wish to avoid getting caught in the middle of a great-power competition between the US and the PRC. The outbreak of open hostilities between these superpowers would endanger not only the core interests of Taiwan, but those of Pacific island countries as well.
Consider the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) states. Under the terms of those agreements, the US has full authority and responsibility for security and defense. A major conflict would undoubtedly require the distributed network of military bases currently under construction across COFA states. It could also draw in other military bases in other Pacific island countries.
There is also the issue of the citizens of Pacific island countries who are members of the US Armed Forces. In any great-power conflict between the US and the PRC, these service members would be expected to join the fight. Pacific island nations therefore share a compelling interest in deterring fighting among major powers in the region.
While traditional security interests often receive top billing, Taiwan and Pacific nations also share a myriad of nontraditional security concerns. This includes the existential threat posed by climate change. Pacific island nations have made clear that “climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and well-being of the peoples of the Pacific.” They are not alone. Taiwan is facing significant climate change effects as well.
Last year, Taiwan had its most severe drought in 56 years. This was due to an unusual lack of typhoons passing over Taiwan proper. These storms play a critical role in refilling reservoirs, and the economic effects of their absence were significant. The drought negatively affected Taiwan’s production of semiconductors among other painful effects, including lost agricultural yields and water rationing.
Of course, not all natural disasters arise from climate change and not all nontraditional security concerns involve natural disasters. On a perennial basis, Taiwan faces risks posed by earthquakes, volcanic activity and tsunamis. It also has to contend with threats posed by infectious diseases, drug trafficking, organized crime, transnational migration, supply chain insecurity and cyberthreats, among other things.
Many Pacific island countries face similar concerns as evidenced by the natural disasters that recently struck Tonga and the cyberattacks that disrupted Internet services in the Marshall Islands.
Beyond security concerns, Taiwan and many Pacific nations also share a desire to preserve the rules-based international order and a preference for democratic political systems. At the Indo-Pacific Leaders Dialogue in 2020, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) declared that Taiwan shares a commitment “to upholding the rules-based international order,” “employing transparency and accountability as the basis for cooperation,” and promoting the “values of democracy and freedom” with Australia.
Similarly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed that the “US, Taiwan and Palau share a strong commitment to democracy, to a free and open Indo-Pacific, and to advancing the peace and prosperity of the region.” In the Blue Pacific Strategy, the member states of the Pacific Islands Forum not only warned that the “established rules-based order for peace and security as set out in the Boe Declaration [on Regional Security] faces increasing pressure, and the Pacific region is not immune.” They also proclaimed that “the Blue Pacific Continent remains committed to principles of democracy.”
While the declarations of countries and actions of their leaders sometimes pull in different directions, there is significant common ground to be found between Taiwan and Pacific nations on these political matters.
When Washington took a closer look at the merits of reimagining the US as a Pacific nation, US policymakers found that it was indeed possible to craft a story through a “complex and intricate mix of history, ideas and interests.” While there are significant differences in the history, ideas and interests of Taiwan and the US, policymakers in Taipei could use a similar narrative framework to craft their own story about Taiwan as a Pacific nation.
If one accepts that argument, several follow-on questions arise. The most immediate are who needs to be persuaded by this story, how difficult would it be to disseminate it to them, and what are the potential benefits and risks of doing so. The government should start exploring these questions to better understand the merits of reimagining Taiwan as a Pacific nation — and it should do so soon.
Michael Walsh is a senior adjunct fellow at Pacific Forum. Adam Morrow is director of the Young Leaders Program at Pacific Forum. Yang Wen-chi is an assistant professor in National Chengchi University’s Department of Diplomacy.
Source: Taipei Times - Editorials 2022/10/26
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