A diplomat’s work is never done and Richard Holbrooke always had too much on his plate. The hardworking envoy died of a broken heart, a torn aorta, after falling ill at work at the State Department in Washington, D.C. Two emergency surgeries failed to repair the damage and now funeral services are being planned for the former United Nations ambassador instead of his customary heavy travel schedule.
Unmentioned in the obituaries, ignored in the laudatory media commentary, and simply unknown to many was Holbrooke’s failed efforts to resolve Taiwan’s status. Holbrooke used Taiwan’s “strategic ambiguity” to full advantage when he helped steer President Jimmy Carter away from official recognition of the Republic of China. However, Holbrooke understood the limits of the unresolved status and urged the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act to shore up the United States’ role as “principal occupying Power” of the island.
Formosa, another name for Taiwan, was Japanese territory at the end of World War II and the United States Navy landed Kuomintang troops of Chiang Kai-shek onto the island in October 1945 to process surrendering Japanese soldiers. The Chinese civil war between the ROC and the communists became the Cold War and President Harry Truman allowed the Chinese Nationalist regime to stay on Formosa where they escaped to establish an exile Chinese government in 1949 when driven from China.
The Taiwanese were promised self-determination after peace came to the Pacific and Cold War tensions relaxed but the occupation by the Chinese Nationalists never ended. Instead the islanders were subjected to four decades of harsh martial law while the United States looked the other way despite the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty which made America the “principal occupying Power.”
Holbrooke, dealing with many different countries and situations during his long career serving Democrat presidents, did not initially have a deep understanding of America’s role in Taiwan’s fate. Instead, Holbrooke embraced the status quo and worked to protect the island from China while maneuvering around the exiled Republic of China.
On December 15, 2008, Holbrooke told the story himself in the Washington Post in a 30-year reminiscence of the recognition of China.
“A way would have to be found by the United States, while recognizing Beijing, to continue dealing with the authorities on Taiwan without recognizing its claim to represent China; most important, Washington had to retain the right to sell arms to Taipei.”
Holbrooke continued opening the door to peek inside the State Department.
“There was no precedent for this in American or international law. With advice from Eisenhower’s attorney general, Herbert Brownell, State Department lawyers drafted the Taiwan Relations Act, a ground-breaking law.”
The customary view of the story is that the Taiwan Relations Act was imposed on a reluctant Carter administration by the powerful Taiwan Lobby headed by U,S. Senator Barry Goldwater.
But as time progressed, Holbrooke became disillusioned with Taiwan’s “strategic ambiguity” to the point of urging a Fourth Communiqué in a New Year’s Washington Post op-ed on January 2, 2002. Presently the State Department follows three previous communiqués on Taiwan issued in 1972, 1978 and 1982 which outline, with varying degrees of clarity, U.S.-China relations on the topic of Taiwan.
“It is time for Washington and Beijing to negotiate a fourth communiqué….At home there will be voices calling for changes in the old formula on Taiwan--something that, I believe, would be possible on the margins but not on the core issue of independence.”
Holbrooke continued, “A new communiqué might not be sufficient to prevent a future confrontation--it could explode over events in Tibet or Taiwan.”
However, it was Holbrooke’s proposal to bring clarity to Taiwan’s status that exploded. The response was almost immediate. The next day the Bush administration explained a fourth communiqué on Taiwan was not needed.
By the end of January 2002, Holbrooke’s proposal was finished off by Nat Bellocchi, former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, with his own op-ed in the Taipei Times.
“It remains very unclear just what motivated a public suggestion that the U.S. consider negotiating a fourth communiqué with China.”
“One reason for considering a new documentation for the U.S. relationship with China, Holbrooke argued, includes the enormous changes that have taken place since the era when the three communiqués were written. In the process of all these changes, however, the ambiguity of the present documents, rules and law that comprise the relationship often allowed the flexibility needed to avoid crises.”
Bellocchi got to the heart of the matter and embraced ambiguity concluding nothing good could come from Holbrooke’s proposal and asked what was Holbrooke’s point?
“Would a fourth communiqué continue to avoid stating the U.S. position on Taiwan’s sovereignty, which is the sovereignty issue is still to be determined?
Source: Michael Richardson - Boston Progressive Examiner
Add this page to your favorite Social Bookmarking websites
| < Prev | Next > |
|---|
