The proposal floated in Washington last week for a meeting between Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou and People's Republic of China State Chairman Hu Jintao during the November 2011 meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leader's forum in Hawaii presents major risks for Taiwan.
During a major conference on cross-strait relations held in Washington D.C. last week, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Vice President Doug Paal suggested that U.S. President Barack Obama should invite Ma to the APEC forum slated to be held in Hawaii next November.
This proposal is not likely to be just a "trial balloon" floated personally by Paal, an ex-director of the Taipei Office of the American Institute for Taiwan, who has close relations with the KMT camp.
Instead, Paal's proposal follows several attempts by Ma to set up his own channels of communication with the PRC's Chinese Communist Party leadership that may aim to open the door for behind-the-scenes negotiations for a meeting with PRC State Chairman and ruling CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao.
Such a meeting would allow Ma, who is currently chairman of the ruling rightist Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), to bypass the old KMT-CCP channels, dominated by rival KMT leaders such as honorary chairmen Lien Chan and Wu Po-hsiung, and establish his own channels of communication with Beijing.
According to the former AIT representative, such an invitation would create a "win-win-win" situation for Washington, Taipei and Beijing.
Such a meeting would take place only months before the critical presidential and legislative elections slated for early 2012 and would mark a major diplomatic breakthrough that could give Ma a needed lift against an opposition Democratic Progressive Party candidate.
To bolster the incentives for the Obama administration, the KMT government could spin a Ma-Hu meeting into a diplomatic achievement for Obama in the run-up to his own re-election bid in November 2012.
Nevertheless, there are severe risks in the path to this political fantasy.
Given the paucity of domestic achievements, Ma can only rely on more concessions from Beijing, especially the expected signing by June of the controversial "Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement," to build his appeal to voters for a second term.
Given the ephemeral character of the recent "improvement" in nominal economic indicators, Ma may use the ECFA as evidence of his diplomatic skills and utilize a "Ma-Hu" meet to test the waters for the signing of a cross-strait peace agreement as a key piece of his re-election drive.
The problem is that Ma has trampled on the democratic principles of legislative check and balance and public overview during the entire process of pushing the ECFA.
Were it not for the KMT's loss of eight of 11 legislative by-elections, Ma would never have agreed to debate the proposed pact with opposition DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen Sunday.
Bipartisan dialogue
Ma's "black box" handling of cross-strait relations and unilateral concessions have placed Taiwan's national interests in jeopardy in the face of both the PRC's relentless political intimidation and military pressure and the pressure for "economic integration."
Even the U.S. State Department exposed the humiliating character of Ma's touted "diplomatic truce" when it acknowledged last week that the invitation issued by the World Health Organization to permit Taiwan's participation in the World Health Assembly as an observer under the denigrating name of "Chinese Taipei" was actually first approved by Beijing.
Similarly, even if the PRC agrees to Ma's attendance at the 2011 APEC meeting, Beijing will undoubtedly have the last say on what status Ma can use.
While Ma would surely be willing to wear any hat to attend APEC and portray himself as "making history," Hu could risk hurting Ma's re-election bid by imposing conditions that seen in Taiwan as too humiliating and open the door to a new Taiwan-centric DPP government.
Washington's attitude to this scenario also deserves close attention.
The Obama administration may not dismiss Paal's suggestion out of hand as Washington decision-makers may want to subtly lend Ma a helping hand if they become wary of the possible uncertainty in the cross-strait "reconciliation" process should the DPP stage a comeback.
We believe it would be wiser for the Obama administration to take into consideration Taiwan's democratic system and the self-inflicted fragility of Ma's leadership caused by his trampling of democratic processes contrary to mainstream Taiwan public will and the incompetence of his KMT administration.
If Ma dares to use a potential meeting with Hu as an excuse to make more unilateral concessions to Beijing, he will face a backlash from Taiwan voters even if such concessions have Washington's seal of approval, as shown in the snafu over the U.S.-Taiwan beef import protocol.
Moreover, Obama should realize that the U.S. cannot stop the DPP from governing again if it wins majority support from the Taiwan electorate.
Instead of choosing sides, Washington should open bipartisan communication on all diplomatic initiatives aimed at benefiting Taiwan, including an APEC invite for the Taiwan president.
Source: Taiwan News Online 2010/04/27
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