Is US President Joe Biden’s Taiwan policy a continuation of his predecessor’s vision? Yes, but the US Indo-Pacific Strategy the Biden administration publicized last month communicates a more comprehensive stance on Taiwan.
In the 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy, then-US president Donald Trump considered Taiwan Washington’s “like-minded partner.”
Biden’s strategy made the bold claim that Taiwan is one of the US’ “leading regional partners.”
This recognition has helped enhance Taiwan’s status, as Taipei is now on par with Washington’s medium-sized partners, such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam and others.
Essentially, there is continuation and reinforcement in the Biden administration’s approach toward Taiwan. Washington has focused on supporting the nation by bolstering security in the Taiwan Strait.
The latest 19-page Indo-Pacific Strategy document shows continuity, but also a nuanced shift in Washington’s Taiwan policy from Trump to Biden.
The importance of Taiwan in Washington’s political agenda, especially under the Trump and Biden administrations, has been widely recognized. The Taiwan Strait has been viewed as one of the most dangerous geopolitical flashpoints in Asia.
In the 2019 strategy, Trump expressed his concern “over Beijing’s actions to bully Taiwan through military maneuvers, economic pressure, constraints on its international space and poaching of its diplomatic partners.”
In the latest strategy, the US briefly mentioned “the growing pressure on Taiwan” as one of the fields of coercive actions by the People Republic of China (PRC).
The novel aspect of the US’ perception of Taiwan is that Biden’s strategy highlights desires of and benefits for Taiwanese.
Washington’s message is sharp and clear: “Taiwan’s future is determined peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best interests of Taiwan’s people.”
However, what are the wishes of Taiwanese?
Most Taiwanese support democracy, although there might be some issues with Taiwan’s political system. Additionally, unification with China has become increasingly unpopular in the nation of 23 million.
A Taiwan Foundation for Democracy poll in December last year showed that 72.5 percent of Taiwanese said they were determined to fight against forced unification by Beijing.
An article published by the Brookings Institution said that the thrust behind the unity among Taiwanese is “a rejection of the PRC’s political system.”
Taiwan’s democratic performance has been appreciated given its dogged efforts amid mounting pressures imposed by Beijing.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index last year ranked Taiwan first among Asia’s “full democracies,” but highlighted the deterioration of democracies worldwide in the face challenges posed by authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia.
Moreover, de facto independent Taiwan was for the first time listed as “free” in this year’s Index of Economic Freedom, released by the Heritage Foundation.
These achievements are likely to buttress Taiwan’s courage to remain unwavering when confronting China’s aggression.
The Biden administration, like that of his predecessor, adheres to the US’ “one China” policy, and its “long-standing commitments” under the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques and the six assurances.
In essence, the Biden administration has no intention to stir trouble with China with regard to Taiwan’s security.
Additionally, the US has sought to reassure Beijing that Washington supports Taipei on many fronts, except if Taiwan were to declare “formal independence.”
Broadly speaking, Washington’s efforts aim to stabilize the geopolitical landscape instead of provoking Beijing. To this end, the US has geared its vision toward shaping “the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the US, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share. We will also seek to manage competition with the PRC responsibly.”
However, what has the US done to shape the balance of influence and to support Taiwan?
The US has affirmed its steadfastness by vowing to “work with partners inside and outside of the region to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”
Instead of walking alone toward “strengthening and deepening [the US’] relationship with Taiwan,” as the Trump administration did, Biden and his team have sought to forge minilateral and multilateral frameworks to counterbalance China’s pressure, and deter Beijing from engaging in warfare to subdue Taiwan.
Notable instances are the so-called “Quad,” comprising the US, Japan, Australia and India; AUKUS, comprising Australia, the UK and the US; and a recent alignment between the US, Japan and Australia. These mechanisms could help improve countries’ relations with Taiwan while shaping a common agenda that addresses China’s rising belligerence.
US support for “Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities” has continued to remain at the locus of Biden’s Taiwan policy.
Since the Trump administration, Washington has stepped up its military assistance to Taiwan. Trump’s approach toward Taiwan has been bolstered by the Biden administration amid calls for Washington to forge its defense support for Taiwan.
The US last month approved a US$100 million arms deal to “sustain, maintain and improve” Taiwan’s missile defense systems.
Enhancing the close security partnership between the US and Taiwan is of vital importance, as China has stepped up provocative actions in Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. China’s intensification of military jet flights near Taiwan has aimed to influence Taiwanese through cognitive warfare, seeking to dissuade Taiwan “from pursuing actions contrary to Beijing’s interests.”
Trump underscored that the US’ “vision and approach in the Indo-Pacific region” closely aligned with Taipei’s New Southbound Policy. This assertion is missing in Biden’s strategy, perhaps because the US aimed to make this grand design more succinct with its promises, objectives and “core lines of effort.”
The Biden administration is expected to bring its Indo-Pacific Strategy more in line with the New Southbound Policy by carving out joint programs to advance cooperation with Taiwan.
The US should seek to facilitate stronger ties between Taiwan and India, Australia and Southeast Asian countries, given Washington’s strategy of bolstering ties with these leading partners.
Nontraditional security issues, such as climate change, healthcare and technology sharing, are priorities of ASEAN countries, covered in the strategies of Taiwan and the US, and therefore are well worth multilateral cooperation.
Commitments made in Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy would serve this three-pronged approach.
The US could further garner joint actions with its allies and partners to prevent undesirable actions by China to change the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait.
The administration of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) could view such actions by Washington as political assurance for Taiwan’s security and further cooperation between the two partners.
China would surely think twice before conducting any military actions that could escalate to conflict and even war in the Strait.
Overall, Washington’s Taiwan policy is timely, as China has been closely watching the Ukraine crisis and might try to take advantage of the US response to Russia’s aggression to exert more pressure on Taiwan.
As the US has committed to “defend [its] interests, deter military aggression against [its] own country and [its] allies and partners — including across the Taiwan Strait,” Washington should reinforce deterrence against China and further support Taiwan by strengthening the “network of security alliances and partnerships.”
Huynh Tam Sang, a doctorate holder and international relations lecturer at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities, is a research fellow at the Taiwan NextGen Foundation and nonresident WSD-Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum. He tweets @huynhtamsang2.
Source: Taipei Times - Editorials 2022/03/13
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