Notwithstanding the lack of rigor in Taiwanese polling, there is food for thought in a survey by Taiwan Thinktank that claims 60 percent of the public have reservations about the economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) that President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wants to sign with China sometime next year.
The poll also suggested a majority believes that the fourth round of  cross-strait talks between Straits Exchange Foundation Chairman Chiang Pin-kung  (江丙坤) and his Chinese counterpart Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), scheduled for next week,  should be delayed over concerns of a replay of the violence that accompanied  Chen’s previous visit.
It is becoming increasingly evident that the pace  of Ma’s cross-strait policies, as well as their long-term impact on sovereignty  and the economy, is causing apprehension. Ma and Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義)  constantly argue that those fears are the result of “poor communication” and  that a new public relations campaign will alleviate these fears. Last week, Wu  went so far as to say that Taipei would seek 60 percent support for an ECFA  before it signs one.
What Ma administration officials say and what they  do, however, are often two different things. As numbers can be massaged in so  many ways, it can be predicted that in a few months from now Wu will be able to  tell a press conference, poll results in hand, that 60 percent of Taiwanese  support an ECFA.
This, however, is only half of the equation — and the  less important one. The real pressure for an ECFA and other cross-strait pacts  comes from Beijing, which stands to gain more from them. Given the size of its  economy, China does not depend on an ECFA with Taiwan, and whatever pressure  exists is the result of political goals, as highlighted by Chinese Premier Wen  Jiabao’s (溫家寶) recent admission that an ECFA is a “stepping stone” to  unification.
Aware that Ma could run out of time if his party’s fortunes  are reversed in the 2012 presidential election, it is difficult to imagine Chen,  Ma or Wu telling Beijing that the plans must be put on ice, or the pace reduced,  simply because they haven’t managed to obtain 60 percent support. After all,  what interest does an authoritarian regime have in opinion polls?
What  this means is that surveys and debates, however democratic, are unlikely to gain  traction with an administration that has only shown disdain for opposition to  its policies. It has already turned down a request for a referendum on an ECFA,  using semantics to justify the decision.
This is an administration that  from the beginning has been on a quest of faith. Both Ma and Wu, in fact, have  used paternalistic language — “trust me, trust us” — to justify policies that  are too convoluted or shrouded in secrecy to be understood by those whose lives  will be directly affected.
Why the Ma administration can ignore the  opposition and wax paternal is simple: The opposition is weak and lacks  credibility, so much so that the government has not bothered to consult it as  Taipei prepares for negotiations with Beijing. This handicap stems not from the  opposition not having a valid argument, but because it has been unable, or  unwilling, to warn of dire consequences if it is not listened to.
Words  and opinion polls are not enough — not when a government is party to a fait  accompli process that threatens to change the nature of this country forever.  Concrete acts are the only thing that will exact a price from the government for  its aloofness.
Source: Taipei Times - Editorials 2009/12/15
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