US, PRC maneuvers post-Morakot

In the past, rich or influential people used to keep a small platform next to the entrance to their house to help people get off their horses. President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) initial rejection of foreign aid in the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot and his interaction with the US and China made me think of this platform, which was built to help people get off their high horses.

Ma probably thought criticism of his government’s weak disaster relief effort would blow over in a couple of days; instead, his inaction prompted the US to take action. When US transport aircraft and minesweeping helicopters appeared over Taiwan, the USS George Washington, an aircraft carrier from the US’ Seventh Fleet, wasn’t far away. As if expecting something big to happen, international media scrambled to Taiwan.

There is an international aspect to the flood disaster, and it begins with China.

On Aug. 11, China launched its largest military exercise to date. The exercise mobilized forces in the Shenyang, Jinan, Guangzhou and Lanzhou military regions for almost two months, and it took place near disputed areas, such as near the border with North Korea, Afghanistan and in the South China Sea. It included paratroopers, simulated warfare in complex electromagnetic environments, the Beidou Satellite Positioning System and civilian aircraft. The whole exercise was reminiscent of a preparatory blitzkrieg exercise. This prompted the USS George Washington to move into position: On Aug. 10, it left its home port in Yokosuka, Japan, for its first visit to Manila in 13 years. In San Diego, California, the USS Nimitz set out on a westward journey.

As the US and China were involved in polite formulaic exchanges, one unusual incident after another took place in Taiwan. At the height of the onslaught of Typhoon Morakot on Aug. 8, the former chief of the general staff left on a visit to Beijing; on Aug. 9, an undersea optical cable just off Taiwan was severed in five places, and the US military’s Asia Pacific command offered to help Taiwan with disaster relief — not once, but twice. On Aug. 10, several countries offered Taiwan assistance.

However, according to reliable sources, the representatives of the Presidential Office, the Cabinet and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) met and decided to accept Chinese assistance instead. On Aug. 11, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) exercise began and Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an urgent telegram rejecting foreign material aid and rescue teams. On Aug. 12, an underwater optical cable was again severed, this time in six places, China rejected a visit to Hong Kong by a Japanese navy vessel, and Premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) said Taiwan was not rejecting foreign aid, signaling a change in situation. On Aug. 14, US Agency for International Development staff arrived in Taiwan, PLA Major-General Luo Yuan (羅援) said Taiwan should review its relationship with the US before a cross-strait military confidence-building mechanism was established, and Ma called a meeting of the National Security Council. On Aug. 15, a US C-130 aircraft arrived in Taiwan. On Aug. 17, US helicopters landed in Taiwan and the US State Department rejected the notion that it had to inform China about its activities. On Aug. 18, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said Beijing was still willing to provide rescue helicopters. On Aug. 20, members of the US Congress traveled on a military aircraft to visit Taiwan. And on Monday, the USS Nimitz arrived at Yokosuka.

Regardless of the cause and intent, the Chinese military exercise, the USS George Washington moving into position in the Philippines, the multiple breaks on two separate instances of a Taiwanese undersea optical cable, the Taiwanese government issuing a “very urgent” telegram rejecting foreign aid, Ma’s neglect of his responsibility as the commander-in-chief and his refusal to declare a state of emergency, the Ma administration’s unthinkable continuous inaction during the height of the calamity and China’s “timely” declaration of its attitude are enough to provide the PLA with a reason to come to Taiwan in the name of humanitarianism. From the perspective of the US-Japan Security Alliance, it could also marginalize the alliance and upset the balance of power that has existed in East Asia for the past 60 years.

Looking back at the first week after Morakot, even if the Ma administration has not been colluding with the Chinese government, its arrogance and public detachment, combined with its eagerness to push cross-strait relations, could still send the wrong message to the US, Japan and China and place Taiwan at risk. The US military’s eagerness to show the flag in this situation is probably a practical matter of “preventive contact.” Whether or not this really is what is going on, we will only know when classified files have been declassified some time in future.

HoonTing is a freelance writer.

TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON

Source: Taipei Times - Editorials 2009/08/30