Taiwan Tati Cultural and Educational Foundation

 
  • Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Home Editorials of Interest Articles of Interest How Ma is undercutting Taiwan-Pacific links

How Ma is undercutting Taiwan-Pacific links

The six - day visit to Taiwan's six Pacific diplomatic partners which President Ma Ying-jeou embarked yesterday evening amid doubts that his Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) administration may undermine instead of bolster Taiwan's strategic position in the Pacific.

Ma's first Pacific voyage was postponed from last October due to pressures of rescue and relief work in the wake of Typhoon Morakot, but the delay also resulted in a sea-change in the character of the program.

The original plan drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had intended to convene the Third Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit in Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands, following two similar summits initiated by former president Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party in Palau and the Marshall Islands in September 2006 and September 2007, respectively.

However, the Office of the President decided to replace the summit with traditional bilateral state visits to the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, the Solomon Islands, and Palau.

The change is both substantial and symbolic.

During Chen's second term, the DPP government initiated the summit approach to use a multilateral forum as a process to build a consolidated "democratic community" among the seven nations.

This multilateral strategy also aimed to improve Taiwan's regional image by promoting better governance and regional progress in a range of fields that complemented the "Pacific Plan" of the 15-nation Pacific Islands Forum.

Under the DPP government's Pacific strategy, the PIF sent deputy secretary-generals to both summits, while the first Palau summit was also attended by officials from Fiji and Guam, which have no formal links with Taiwan.

Australia and New Zealand welcomed Taiwan's new strategy as an innovative departure from the notorious past practice of "money diplomacy" fostered by the rivalry between the authoritarian People's Republic of China and Taiwan.

However, the Ma administration has renounced the multilateral approach in the Pacific, ostensibly on the grounds that the "diplomatic truce" between the KMT government and Beijing has "stabilized" Taiwan's ties with the six Pacific allies and because the bilateral approach is "more sincere" for maintaining official relations and deepening cooperation.

This decision is shortsighted for several reasons.

First, the decision will isolate Taiwan from regional multilateral processes such as the evolution of the 1982 Nauru Agreement, which includes all of Taiwan Pacific allies, to set up a "cartel" to jointly decide the price of tuna.

Since Taiwan's fishery industry relies heavily on tuna in the Pacific, the DPP government used the summit dialogue with its allies to avoid serious damage to Taiwan's commercial interests, but the Ma administration has now cut this channel.

Second, despite Ma's touted "diplomatic truce," Beijing has shown no signs of ceasing to build its Pacific position, excluding Taiwan from direct participation in PIF or other regional bodies, such as the new South Pacific Tourism Organization, and even undermining the connections between Taiwan and its six allies.

Third, Australia and New Zealand welcomed the DPP's Pacific strategy since channelling assistance through a multilateral process was more transparent and would help Taiwan avoid getting embroiled in domestic political conflicts, such as the Solomons, due to bilateral pressures from allies. Not only does the reversion to bilateralism restore Taiwan's vulnerability to demands by individual allies, but both Canberra and Wellington have already expressed their concerns for the Ma government's use of a so-called "Rural Development Fund" to deepen Taiwan's bilateral relationships, which seems to harken back to "checkbook diplomacy."

Moreover, in light of the shared Austronesian heritage of Taiwan's indigenous peoples and the peoples of our Pacific allies, the DPP government proposed the establishment of an "Austronesian Cultural Forum" in the second Taiwan - Pacific summit with an office to be set up in Palau.

A major goals of this initiative was to join with our Pacific allies to jointly apply to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for "world heritage" status for the endangered Austronesian culture.

However, the PRC plans to use its UN membership to apply for a cultural legacy status by linking aboriginal cultures in its Yunnan and Guizhou provinces with Taiwan's unrelated Austronesian indigenous peoples.

Ma's abandonment of the multilateral Taiwan - Pacific summit process and the KMT legislature's excision of the proposed budget for Taiwan's contribution to the Palau office could leave Taiwan and our indigenous peoples vulnerable to this "one China culture" power play.

Finally, Ma's abandonment of the DPP era constructive and integrated trategy of building a multilateral "Taiwan-Pacific democratic community" will weaken Taiwan's strategic position in the face of an intensified PRC push to build its own "authoritarian community" through support for military governments in Fiji and Tonga.

Even more worrisome is the latent threat that if Ma loses his re-election bid in March 2012, Beijing will engineer the defection of several of our Pacific allies, some of which plan to allow Beijing to set up "commercial offices." Therefore, we urge Ma to reconsider the importance of a grand Pacific strategy for Taiwan during his whirlwind tour.


Source: Taiwan News Online - Editorial 2010/03/22



Add this page to your favorite Social Bookmarking websites
Reddit! Del.icio.us! Mixx! Google! Live! Facebook! StumbleUpon! Facebook! Twitter!  
 

Newsflash


Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, top center, inspects troops during a military review at the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s Asaka training ground near Tokyo yesterday.
Photo: AFP

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told Japanese troops yesterday that Japan would not tolerate the use of force to change the region’s “status quo,” comments likely to rile Beijing, which is locked in a long and bitter territorial dispute with Tokyo.

“Use of force for changing the status quo” is an expression often used by Japanese politicians and security experts to indirectly refer to what they see as China’s aggressive maritime expansion in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.